Strong social constructionism

Strong social constructionists oppose the existence of "brute" facts. That a mountain is a mountain (as opposed to just another undifferentiated clump of earth) is socially engendered, and not a brute fact. That the concept of mountain is universally admitted in all human languages reflects near-universal human consensus, but does not make it an objective reality. Similarly for all apparently real objects and events: trees, cars, snow, collisions. This leads to the view that all reality is a social construction, which is close to the view of many post-modernist philosophers like Jean-François Lyotard, who claim that our view of reality is really a narrative, a discourse rooted in consensus.

In particular, science does not have any ontological primacy; all scientific constructs, physical laws, or concepts like mass, or quark, are essentially arrived at by consensus (possibly because they satisfy some mutually-agreed criteria, such as the Occam's razor), and are social constructs:

Science is a highly elaborated set of conventions brought forth by one particular culture (our own) in the circumstances of one particular historical period; thus it is not, as the standard view would have it, a body of knowledge and testable conjecture concerning the real world. It is a discourse, devised by and for one specialized interpretive community, under terms created by the complex net of social circumstance, political opinion, economic incentive and ideological climate that constitutes the ineluctable human environment of the scientist. Thus, orthodox science is but one discursive community among the many that now exist and that have existed historically. Consequently its truth claims are irreducibly self-referential, in that they can be upheld only by appeal to the standards that define the scientific community and distinguish it from other social formations.