Social choice theory is a theoretical framework for measuring individual interests, values, or welfares as an aggregate towards collective decision. A non-theoretical example of a collective decision is passing a set of laws under a constitution. Social choice theory dates fromCondorcet's formulation of the voting paradox. Kenneth Arrow's 1951 book Social Choice and Individual Values and Arrow's impossibility theorem in it established the theory in its modern form.
Social choice theory blends elements of welfare economics and voting theory and generalizes them. It is methodologically individualistic, that is, "bottom-up," in aggregating from individuals to society. A characteristic method proceeds from formulating some set of apparently reasonable axioms of social choice to construct a social welfare function (or constitution) and derive the implications of those axioms. Many earlier results indicate the logical incompatibility of different axioms, revealing an aggregation problem and suggesting reformulation or theoretical triage in dropping some axiom(s).
A related field is public choice theory. The fields may overlap, but narrowly construed, the JEL classification codes place Social Choice under JEL D71 (with Clubs, Committees, and Associations) while most Public Choice articles fall under JEL D72 (Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior).
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